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Abstract
This paper presents an overview of the reflect project. It defines the notion of knowledge
level reflection that has been central to the project, it compares this notion with existing
approaches to reflection in related fields, and investigates some of the consequences of the
concept of knowledge level reflection: what is a general architecture for knowledge level
reflection, how to model the object component in such an architecture, what is the nature
of reflective theories, how can we design such architectures, and what are the results of
our actual experiments with such systems?
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1 Problem statement
1.1 Definition
Current knowledge-based systems lack the capabilities to perform a number of functions
which are generally attributed to human experts: competence assessment, knowledge base
maintenance, knowledge refinement, sensible explanation, adaptive interaction, perfor-
mance validation, verification of internal knowledge consistency, etc. The fundamental
premise that underlies this paper is that such advanced functions of knowledge-based sys-
tems can only be realised by creating a reflective system, i.e. a system that is able to
reason about itself, its own knowledge of a problem domain, its problem solving strate-
gies, the scope of its competence and its history in terms of solved cases. Reflective
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reasoning requires a self-representation, a mechanism for reasoning about and with such a
self-representation, and a means of controlling the interaction between the object problem
solver and the reflective component. Through reflective reasoning the system is able to
know why it can or cannot solve a particular problem. It is capable of indicating where
gaps in its knowledge base exist and how these gaps may be filled. Also, a reflective system
is able to act upon the object problem solver, e.g. to adapt its behaviour in case a difficult
problem is encountered or when an impasse in the problem solving process occurs. The
goal of this paper is to investigate how more flexible and robust knowledge-based systems
can be constructed using the concept of reflection.
Before we can elaborate this goal, we first have to establish precisely what we mean
by reflection and reflective systems and what we consider to be the scope of reflection.
1.2 Context
Reflection in its common sense meaning refers to the activity of pondering about oneself,
about one’s own behaviour and about one’s relation to the outside world. In recent AI
research the term reflective system is used to identify a class of systems which in some
way or other have knowledge about themselves and which are able to reason about and
act upon themselves. In this view reflective systems are closely related, but not identical
to meta-level systems [Maes & Nardi, 1988].
Maes [Maes, 1987] defines a reflective system as a computational system which has
not only knowledge and data about some part of the external world, the object domain,
enabling it to reason about and -sometimes act upon- that domain, but which also has
the ability to reason and act upon itself. Reflection requires a self-representation, which
is causally connected [Smith, 1982] to the object system such that actions in the object
system are reflected in the self-representation and changes in the self-representation are
reflected in the object system. Maes distinguishes reflective systems from meta-systems.
etc In this paper we take a broader view on reflection: A reflective system is a system
that has knowledge about some part of itself: the object component. This knowledge is
called the model of the object component. In addition a reflective system contains meta-
knowledge which allows it to reason about and act upon the object component. In principle
the object component and the meta component could coincide, in which case the system
is a fully reflective system. In many cases, however, the knowledge about the object part
of the system is only partial. In that case the system can be viewed as consisting of a
meta-system and an object system. In this view, systems that perform meta-level reasoning
as Maes defines it [Maes, 1987], are considered a subset of (partially) reflective systems.
Questions addressed in this paper
• How can we realise flexible and robust behaviour of knowledge-based systems using
reflection?
• How do various views on reflection relate to each other? (section 2)
• What is the nature of the object model needed to perform a variety of reflective
tasks (sections 3 and 4).
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• What meta-knowledge needs to be represented in order to achieve reflective tasks
(section 5).
• What architectural choices do we have when designing reflective systems and what
are the consequences of these choices (section 6).
Section 7 presents some examples of reflective systems that have been implemented.
2 Approach
2.1 Background
In this section we will discuss work on reflection in two distinct, though related areas of
science: Logic and Computer Science. For each of these areas we will give a brief summary
of the major topics, problems, approaches and solutions concerning reflection, and we will
indicate what the impact of this work is on the approach to reflection described in this
paper.
2.1.1 Reflection in Logic
Both building formal systems that describe other formal systems, and building systems
with self-referential capabilities are activities with a long standing tradition in logic and
meta-mathematics. The purpose of this section is to present briefly the most important
results achieved by logicians in this area.
Encoding truth and provability
The earliest, and probably most widely known work on self-referential systems is that by
Go¨del [Godel, 1931]. He devised a way of encoding certain meta-statements concerning
the syntax and proof theory of his object-formalism (Peano Arithmetic) as statements in
that same object-formalism. Thus, predicates stating, for instance, that one formula con-
cerning natural numbers followed from another by some rule of inference, were represented
by object-predicates using natural numbers. Using this construction, Go¨del could prove
certain properties of such self-encoding systems: any theory in which such encoding is
possible must be incomplete (first incompleteness theorem), and no consistent theory can
prove its own consistency (second incompleteness theorem). The proofs of these (mostly
negative) results relied on the possibility of constructing self-referential sentences, which
encoded their own unprovability, such as the sentence φ : ¬Prov(φ) (where φ stands for
the encoding of φ).
A closely related result was obtained by Tarski [Tarski, 1936]. He proved that if we
explicitly add to a theory a truth predicate defined by True(φ)↔ φ (known as the Tarski
biconditionals), then the theory becomes inconsistent. Again, this proof relies on the
construction of a self-referential sentence, the liar sentence L : ¬True(L), which leads to
a contradiction. Attempts have been made to avoid the negative results of Go¨del and
Tarski. Kripke [Kripke, 1975] suggested a construction in which True(φ)∨True(¬φ) only
holds for some formulae φ. A closely related suggestion is made by Perlis [Perlis, 1985].
The recent book by Turner [Turner, 1990] provides an excellent and thorough exploration
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of these and other attempts at encoding truth and provability, but makes it clear that
many of the issues arising from self-reference are still unresolved.
Inter-theory inference
It is in the work of Feferman that the term reflection principle originated [Feferman, 1962;
page 274]:
“By a reflection principle we understand a description of a procedure for adding
to any set of axioms A certain new axioms whose validity follows from the
validity of the axioms A and which formally express, within the language of A,
evident consequences of the assumption that all the theorems of A are valid.”
A somewhat different use of the term “reflection principle” is found in the work on logic in
AI. Originally, in [Weyhrauch, 1980], we find reflection principles defined as: “a statement
of a relation between a theory and its meta-theory” which is then formalised as an inference
rule with its premise and conclusion in different theories (namely the object- and meta-
theories of the system). The standard examples of this form of reflection principle as an
inter-theory inference rule are the rules up and down, reflecting between an object-theory
O and a meta-theory M:
` ∆Oφ
` ∆MProv(φ) up
` ∆MProv(φ)
` ∆Oφ down.
This situation is close to that described by the Tarski biconditionals, although the dif-
ference is of course that here M and O can be different theories, thus avoiding the
contradiction-generating self-referential sentences.
These rules up and down and the associated two-theory framework have been imple-
mented in fol [Weyhrauch, 1980]. The system imposes no constraints on the definition of
Prov as given by the user, and fol can thus be used to implement either truthful, enlarged
or partial reflection, which are defined in the literature review [Giunchiglia & Smaill, 1988]
as follows: truthfulness only allows the extension of the O with results consistent with
O; in enlarged reflection truthfulness is dropped, and partial reflection only allows the
extension of O with results already derivable in O itself (ie. definitional extensions).
Although the rules up and down are the reflection rules most often mentioned in
the literature, they are by no means the only possibility [Giunchiglia & Serafini, 1990]
generalises the notion to arbitrary inference rules that link two theories.
Naming
In the above, we have written Prov(x) and True(x) without explicitly stating the syntactic
status of x. If we want to stay within the context of first order logic, and thus require
Prov and True to be first order predicates (as opposed to, say, modal operators or second
order predicates), then x must be a first order term, in particular the name of a first order
formula. This implies that sentences of our object-language must be named by terms
which can be used as argument to the meta-predicates. Logicians have employed two
types of naming [Tarski, 1936], namely quotation-mark names and structural descriptive
names. Quotation-mark names associate with a formula φ a constant as its name, often
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written as φ or “φ”. Go¨del’s encoding, described above, is an example of this type of
naming. Structural descriptive names are arbitrarily complex ground terms which reflect
the structure of the sentence they name.
Both these types of naming relations are entirely “syntactic”, in the sense that names
are determined only by the syntactic structure of the object-expression. [vanHarmelen,
1992] on the other hand argues that naming can also be defined on non-syntactic grounds
(semantic, pragmatic), and that this opens up the possibility of exploiting the name re-
lation to encode more information about the object-theory than is possible with purely
syntactic naming.
The relation between languages
As discussed in the above, it is of crucial importance whether the meta-predicates such as
Prov and the names such as φ belong to the same theory as the sentences φ themselves.
Go¨del’s system, where formulae about natural numbers were encoded as (or: named by)
natural numbers, the formulae and their names belonged to the same theory, whereas the
bi-lingual framework of fol separates the two, as is indicated by the subscripts M and O
to the derivability symbol in the rules up and down above and thus avoids the problems
caused by self-reference (since we have φ ∈ O, φ ∈M and O ∩M = ∅).
In the context of the rules up and down, if all objects (i.e. formulae and their names)
belonged to the same language (i.e. φ ∈ O, φ ∈ O, and M = O), also called the amalga-
mated approach, the rule up could be proved as a derived inference rule (in other words,
it is a form of partial reflection), whereas the rule down is an enlarged reflection principle.
The rules up and down are also presented in [Bowen & Kowalski, 1982], where the
authors start from an object-theory O, describe an associated meta-theory M , and then
“amalgamate” the two theories.
Summary
In the above, we have given a brief overview of the work on reflection, encoding and
self-reference in logic.
Fundamental is the work of Go¨del and Tarski, leading to mostly negative results about
the properties of self-encoding systems (incompleteness, inconsistency).
Work by Kripke and Perlis attempts to avoid these negative results by introducing
variants of the truth predicate. Other attempts at avoiding the inconsistencies of self-
encoding systems are the iterated extensions of axiom sets by Turing and Feferman, where
the word “reflection principle” originated.
A third approach, aimed at avoiding self-reference altogether, is to separate object-
and meta-theory, as proposed by Weyhrauch. This leads to viewing reflection principles
as inter-theory inference rules.
Fundamental in all this is the notion of naming formulae by ground terms, so that the
encoding of an object-theory in a meta-theory can be done within a first order framework.
A final strand in the work on reflection in logic has been on the encoding of belief,
in contrast with the work described above which is concerned with encoding truth and
provability. Work on encoding belief in logic has been based on either modal or first order
formalisms, but both approaches suffer from problems similar to those encountered in
encoding truth and provability.
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2.1.2 Computational Reflection
The term reflection has been used in computer science to denote computational systems
that, in addition to their computation on aspects of the world, perform computation on
aspects of themselves, i.e., their data, program or execution process. A reflective system
has a meta-level architecture. The part of the system that is reasoned about, the object-
level, is represented at the meta-level. This self-representation and the object-level are
causally connected, a term that is informally described in [Maes, 1987] as a link between
a representation and a system that it represents, such that if one of these changes, the
other changes accordingly (the representation is still truthful). In this context [Smith,
1982] introduces the notions introspective integrity and introspective force. Introspective
integrity concerns the question whether any significant property of the representation
at the meta-level is in accordance with its content (the represented object-level). Since
integrity is a quality of the representation at the meta-level, it is realised by the causal
connection upwards. Introspective force involves the realisation of a system’s reflective
goals in the object-level through the causal connection downwards.
The implementation of a reflective computational system is according to a particular
reflective architecture that determines the representation (languages and interpreters) of,
and the control flow between the system components and provides a mechanism imple-
menting the causal connections. A reflective programming language is a language that
supports programming reflective systems. Such a language has facilities that support the
writing of computational systems that are “able to access and manipulate causally con-
nected representations of themselves during computation” [Maes, 1987]. Although reflec-
tive systems need not be programmed in reflective languages, most work in computational
reflection is focussed on the definition of reflective languages.
Reflective languages
Most reflective computation in languages that constitute landmarks in the brief history of
computational reflection concerns control of the object-level computation.
In 3-lisp [Smith, 1984] this is realised by reflective functions that are interpreted
by meta-circular interpreters. A meta-circular interpreter is an explicit representation
of the interpreter in the language itself which is used to actually run the language. The
meta-circular interpreter makes explicit the the variable binding environment and the con-
tinuation of the interpreter at the lower level which can then be inspected and influenced
by the reflective function.
3-krs [Maes, 1987] is an object-oriented programming language. Reflective computa-
tion is specified by means of meta-objects that represent reflective information about and
that can access and modify the computation performed by other objects. Again these are
evaluated by a meta-circular interpreter.
teiresias [Davis, 1980] is an early example of a rule language that allows meta-rules
to order and prune a set of object-rules1 that are plausible for reaching an object-level
goal. Meta-rules in teiresias describe the domain specific content of plausible object-
rules, but do not mention them explicitly. Abstracting away from the domain, meta-rules
1[Davis, 1980] uses the term knowledge source in order to indicate that any form of encoding can be
used, not only rules.
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in heracles refer to knowledge roles rather than specific domain objects [Clancey, 1983].
soar [Laird et al., 1987] is an attempt to provide an architecture for general intel-
ligence. It is dedicated to the problem space hypothesis: all goal-oriented behaviour is
based on search in problem spaces. Although not originally conceived as a meta-level or
reflective architecture, soar can be specified as a multi-level architecture that can reflect
upon its own problem solving behaviour [Rosenbloom et al., 1988]. The architecture has
three distinct meta-levels: (1) a problem space level that contains operators, states and
goals in contexts; (2) a production level that applies productions (condition-action pairs)
from long-term memory to the objects in working memory in order to implement oper-
ators; (3) a preference level that selects between alternative candidate objects resulting
from productions or that signals an impasse, i.e., the impossibility to select an object or
apply an operator. In the latter case a subgoal is setup that makes explicit the impasse
and why and where it occurred. The subgoal to resolve the impasse is carried out by search
in a new problem solving context for which the same three-level architecture is applied
(and which may lead to new impasses that are resolved at higher levels). For example, an
impasse in operator application is resolved by searches for a state that allows execution
of the operator. A selection impasse is resolved by look-ahead search. In this manner the
full capacity of soar can be applied to basic operations as well as to resolving impasses
by reflecting upon the problem solving capabilities itself.
An architecture for computational reflection more oriented towards logic is fol
[Weyhrauch, 1980], that distinguishes theories and meta-theories in first order logic. The
notable purpose of reflection here is to change theorem proving in the object-theory into
evaluation in the meta-theory. Such a meta-theory may for example consist of subsidiary
deduction rules that shorten a proof.
Recent work on meta-programming in logic programming resulted in various proposals
for meta-level extensions to logic programming languages in the form of meta-interpreters,
following the seminal work of [Bowen & Kowalski, 1982]. In particular, go¨del [Hill
& Lloyd, 1991] is a serious attempt to provide meta-logical facilities with a declarative
semantics. The approach here is to make a clear distinction between the language at the
object-level and its representation via a syntactic naming relation.
Summary
Reflection in computational systems refers to the computation of a program on aspects
of the program itself. Its purpose in existing architectures has been mainly control of
object-level computation. In order to achieve that purpose a variety of architectures is
conceivable. These differ on the self-representation of a system, the causal connection
between the self-representation and the object-level, the computation needed when per-
forming reflection and the locus of action between object- and meta-level.
2.2 Definition of the approach: Knowledge level reflection
From the literature discussed in the previous section, a number of topics seem to re-occur
as issues concerning reflection in each of the three subfields. In section 2.2.1 we first
describe these (five) re-occurring issues and devote a subsection to each. In 2.2.2, we
subsequently define our own approach to building reflective systems in terms of specific
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positions that we take on each of these issues, again devoting a subsection to each of the
issues.
2.2.1 Issues in building reflective systems
The nature of the object-model
By object-model we mean the representation, or model, that the meta-system has of the
object-system, and through which it reasons about the object-system. In logic, the object-
model is created through applying the (syntactically defined) naming relation to object-
expressions, resulting in the meta-terms which name the object-expressions, and which
are the subject of the meta-theory.
In many of the computational reflective systems, the object-representation captures
various degrees of abstractions of the computational mechanisms of the object-system:
3-lisp’s meta-theories deal with function-call-continuations and bindings environments,
those of 3-krs deal with message passing and inheritance, and teiresias deals with
conflict resolutions sets, which shows that all of these reflective systems deal with compu-
tational aspects of their object-system.
Cognitive science has little consensus of the nature and structure of the model we have
of our own knowledge. The soar architecture, which does propose a specific model, does
indeed originate in cognitive science, but does not in any way represent an emerging view
in the field.
Separation vs. amalgamation
This issue concerns the relation between meta-and object-system. Are they two separate
systems that communicate with each other, or is one a subpart of the other? In logic,
where this issue corresponds to the relations between the languages used to express object-
and meta-theory, both approaches have been investigated. In computer science, both
approaches are also present, with e.g. fol representing a separated approach, and 3-
lisp and 3-krs an amalgamated approach. In cognitive science this issue is found in the
use/mention distinction that underlies reflective access.
Causal connection
The problems of connecting object- and meta-system is a third issue which occurs in each
of the three subfields dealing with reflection. The reflection rules in logic, the causal con-
nection in computational systems and the influence that meta-cognitive processes have on
the way we solve a problem are all concerned with connecting object- and meta-component,
and specify how information flows from one to the other, and how the two complements
influence each other.
Switching the locus of action
A direct implication of our choice of separating the object-system from the meta-system
is that we must decide which system is active at any one point. In the computer science
literature, this is described as the switch of the locus of action, and in cognitive science
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this amounts to switching between cognitive and meta-cognitive activities. The notion of
switching is not directly found in logic, since logic deliberately abstracts from control.
The nature of reflective theories
All three approaches to reflection share an interest in the nature of the contents of the
reflective components. How general can they be formulated, how independent from the
object-system can they be, do they have a generic form, what topics of interest can be
treated in such reflective theories, etc, are all questions concerning the general nature of
meta-theories that are addressed in each of the three subfields.
2.2.2 Knowledge level reflection
In this section we will define our own approach to reflection, which differs from the existing
approaches outlined in section 2.1. We will define our approach in terms of our position
on each of the four general issues in building reflective systems that were discusses in the
previous section. Our position on the first issue (the nature of the self-representation)
is the one that is most markedly different from existing approaches. The choice that we
make concerning this issue will then largely determine our position on each of the other
general issues.
Abstract object-models
It is the treatment of the object-model which separates our approach to reflection most
markedly from existing approaches in the literature. Both logic-based and computational
approaches to reflection use object-models which make detailed commitments to the syn-
tactic and computational aspects of their object-system: logic’s syntactic naming mirrors
the object-system’s syntax in the meta-theory, and the meta-components of computa-
tional systems like 3-lisp and 3-krs make detailed assumptions about the computational
mechanisms of their object-systems.
In contrast with all of this, our own approach to reflection is based on the idea that a
meta-theory should, as much as possible, be independent from such syntactic or computa-
tional details of its object-system. A meta-theory should be concerned with the functional
behaviour of its object-system, independently from the syntactic and computational details
of how this behaviour is realised. We have coined the term knowledge-level reflection form
this idea, since our point of view resembles that advocated by Newell [Newell, 1982], who
argued that the “knowledge level” would be the appropriate level for describing AI systems.
The term “knowledge-level” is the cause of much confused debate in the AI community.
In the context of this paper, no more should be read in this term than that a “knowledge-
level representation” is an abstract representation that captures essential problem solving
capabilities without defining how such capabilities should be computationally realised.
Thus, a meta-theory should be concerned with the kind of task performed by the object-
system (such as diagnosis, monitoring, design, etc), and with the knowledge needed to
perform that task, but not with the computational mechanisms that are used to perform
that task or to represent that knowledge, be they logical deduction, messages between
objects or production rules.
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This choice for abstracting away in the meta-theory and object-model from computa-
tional and implementational details is motivated and justified by the type of reflective task
that we want to tackle in the meta-theory. As discussed in the introduction, these are tasks
like competence assessment, sensible explanation, adaptive interaction, etc. All of these
tasks (and many more) are concerned with the “essential problem solving capabilities” of
the object-system, quite independently from how these capabilities are realised.
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 will be devoted to discussing the structure and contents of both the
object-models and the meta-theories required for such knowledge level reflection, but we
will first investigate what the implications are of our commitment to abstract, knowledge-
level object-models for the other three central issues in building reflective systems that
were discussed in the previous section.
Separated systems
Our commitment to object-models that abstract from implementation details of the object-
system necessarily implies at least a conceptual separation between the object-system
and its model at the meta-level: the object-system is an implemented system, and must
thus be concerned with implementational mechanisms (“symbol-level aspects”, in Newell’s
terminology), whereas the object-model at the meta-level is the abstract (“knowledge
level”) representation of the object-system. In section 3.3.1, we will argue that it is in
fact possible to use the same symbolic structures for the dual purposes of object-system
(symbol-level computation) and object-model (knowledge-level representation), but, at
least conceptually, the two should be treated as separate. An additional advantage of this
separation between object-system and its representation at the meta-level is that we avoid
the paradoxes arising from self-referential constructs.
Causal connection must make non-syntactic distinctions
Our commitment to abstract (“knowledge-level”) object-models means that we must de-
part from the standard approach to base the object-model only on syntactic distinctions
in the object-system. As will be discussed in section, 3.1, we will want our object-model
to capture distinctions between different types of knowledge used in the object-system.
For instance, in a diagnostic system, we may want to distinguish abstraction-rules, causal-
rules, generalisation-rules, etc, even though all these rules may be represented in the
object-system using the same syntax. Besides syntactic distinctions, we will also want
to capture semantic and pragmatic distinctions between elements of the object-system:
different types of knowledge and how these are used.
However, even though the object-model should be based on such categories that are
not necessarily syntactically distinguishable, the causal connection is required to make
a link between such functional categories in the object-model on the one hand, and the
implementational structures in the object-system that underly these categories on the
other hand.
[vanHarmelen, 1992] describes how such non-syntactic distinctions can be captured by
extending the usual notion of naming between object- and meta-theory.
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Locus of action
Our approach to reflection does not commit us to specific ways of switching the locus of
action between object- and meta-system. Section 3.3.2 will investigate the pro’s and con’s
of various switching paradigms, but these comparisons are made on architectural and not
on conceptual grounds.
Generalised reflective theories
A major advantage of our approach to reflection is that our meta-theories are applicable
to a wider class of object-systems. Because our object-models only capture the func-
tional behaviour of the object-systems, and abstract away from implementation details,
the meta-theories based on these object-models will be applicable to any object-system
that realises a certain functionality (say abductive diagnosis, or design), irrespective of
how this functionality is implemented.
In section 3.2, we will argue that a reflective e task is like any other problem solving
task, with the exception that its application domain is somewhat different (it is not a
part of the external world, but instead another problem solver), an we will investigate the
consequences of this.
In section 4, we will see that it is also possible to apply multiple reflective theories to
a single object-system (say one reflective theory that does competence assessment, and
another that does sensible explanation). Similarly, it will turn out to be possible to apply
a single meta-theory to multiple object-systems, thus requiring multiple abstract models
at the meta-level. We introduce the term n:1-reflection for the first arrangement, en 1:n-
reflection for the second. Of course, the fully general m:n variation is also a possibility.
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to considering in greater detail each of the
five issues that were treated in this section. Section 3.1 deals with the issues concerning
the self-model, section 3.2 investigates the general nature of our meta-theories, section
3.3.1 discusses the implementational consequences of our standpoint on amalgamation vs.
separation, and sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 investigate the implementational issues related to
our choices on the causal connection and the switching paradigm.
3 Results
3.1 Model of the Object-Component
3.1.1 Using KADS for modelling the object-component
As pointed out the previous section, the nature of the model of the object-component is
the prime discriminating factor for knowledge-level reflection. The position taken in the
previous section on the abstract, implementation independent, knowledge-level nature of
the object-model raises the question of how we should realise such object-models. For an
answer to this question, we can look to some of the developments in the field of knowledge-
engineering, where, although for different reasons, the construction of KBS-models with
similar properties has received much attention in the past decade.
The particular knowledge-level models we use in our experiments are the models used
in the KADS approach to knowledge engineering [Breuker & Wielinga, 1989, Wielinga et
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al., 1992]. KADS models contain the following three types of ingredients:
1. Knowledge describing which inferences are needed in an application. Inferences
describe the basic reasoning steps that one wants to make in some domain and the
roles that pieces of domain knowledge that are manipulated by the inferences play in
the overall reasoning process. The set of inferences is often graphically represented in
a diagram showing the input-output dependencies between inferences: the so-called
“inference structure”.
2. Knowledge about the structure of the domain-specific knowledge required to perform
inferences. The basic reasoning steps that make up the inference process will assume
certain types of domain knowledge to be present.
3. Control knowledge which is used to determine how inferences are sequenced in a
particular situation. The notion of a task is used to structure this control knowledge.
A task defines a typical decomposition into inferences and/or sub-tasks together with
internal sequencing information.
The different categories of knowledge have particular relations to each other: control
knowledge invokes an inference; an inference applies domain knowledge.
An important property of KADS models is that they are independent of the specific
details of the domain of the object-system. The model only contains object-domain inde-
pendent knowledge about how the application task will be realised in the object system.
For example, in the case of an object-system for diagnosing faults in an audio-system, the
KADS model only contains knowledge about diagnosing such devices in general and does
not contain knowledge specific for audio systems. In knowledge engineering this property
is exploited by reusing (parts) of such a model in domains with similar characteristics,
thus preventing the knowledge engineer from reinventing the wheel each time a new appli-
cation is being built. For the type of reflective systems we are aiming at it means that the
self-model is much more general than the specific system for which it has been constructed.
3.1.2 Languages for representing the self-model
To be able to use knowledge-level models as a self-model in a reflective system, it is
necessary to have a formal and interpretable representation of such models. The KADS
framework as presented in the literature [Breuker & Wielinga, 1989, Wielinga et al., 1992]
uses a highly structured, but still partly informal modelling language and can thus not be
used directly for knowledge-level reflection. In REFLECT, two different languages were
developed for solving this problem:
Formal specification through (ML)2 (ML)2 is a formal specification language for
KADS models of expertise. This language offers a many-sorted logic, a module alge-
bra for defining multiple theories, and a meta-level organisation using user-definable
naming relations between theories.2 For a detailed description of (ML)2 the reader
2As remarked in the previous section, the internal structure of KADS models is also of a meta-like
nature, in particular the relation between inferences and domain structures. This meta-object relation
within a KADS model should not be confused with the meta-object relation between reflective system and
object-system.
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is referred to [Akkermans et al., 1992, vanHarmelen & Balder, 1992]. An example
(ML)2 model of a problem solving method can be found in [Schreiber et al., 1992].
Operational specification through Model-K Model-K [Karbach et al., 1991] is an
operational language for implementing KADS models. Model-K provides language
constructs that retain to a large degree the information present in the KADS model,
in addition to the implementation details. In this way, model-K ensures that the code
of the final system can be used to access the knowledge-level model from which it
was built. This information-preserving property of the object system is an important
facilitating requirement for building the type of reflective systems we are aiming at.
We will address this issue concerning the relation between self-model and object-
system in more detail in the next section.
Besides opting for the use of KADS models to describe the object-system’s model at
the meta-level, we can of course also use the KADS framework to describe the meta-theory
itself. After all, the meta-system is a KBS in its own right, be it one that has another
KBS as its application domain. We can thus describe the meta-theory as a KADS model,
containing the three ingredients of domain, inference and control knowledge as specified
above, with the specific constraint that the KADS model of the object-system is part of
the domain knowledge of the meta-system. This gives rise to a model of the meta-theory
as depicted in figure 1.
HHHHHj
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@
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of object-system
KADS model
of meta-system
KADS model
control
inference
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inference
control
domain
Figure 1: Use of KADS models in knowledge level reflection
3.2 The nature of reflective theories
The purpose of this section is to investigate the general nature of the contents of reflective
problem solvers. Since reflective problem solvers perform many of the same tasks as
ordinary problem solvers, we can expect that many of the general models that are available
for ordinary problem solving will be equally applicable to reflective problem solvers. In
this section, we will take the existing KADS model for a diagnose-repair task, and we will
instantiate this model with the general types of knowledge required for a reflective theory
that diagnoses malfunctions in its object-system.
13
3.2.1 Reflective Task and Inference Knowledge
We can ascribe various behaviors to the reflective component, for instance, predicting the
effort of problem solving and the quality of the solution, recognizing impasses in the object
problem solver or dynamically re-configuring the problem solver in cases of unsatisfactory
behavior. Notwithstanding the variety, we can identify generic tasks that cover the specific
instances of reflective reasoning. One way to model the reflective component is to regard
it as consisting of a diagnose step where potential causes of incompetence are located and
repair actions to overcome the incompetence. Although being slightly different, monitoring
and control tasks can also be explained by this model.
Diagnose comprises inspecting resp. analyzing the object problem solver and inter-
preting the obtained findings in terms of potential causes of incompetence. Diagnosis is
necessary for example, if an impasse in the object problem solver occurs. But even before
an error actually occurs, an analysis of the object problem solvers can identify causes of
a potential If the findings are compared to predefined norms, the interpretation step can
expand to an entire assessment task or to a prediction task if the future behavior of the
system is of interest.
Repair may be viewed as improving the competence depending on the outcome of
diagnosis. The repair subtask consists of proposing repair actions and applying them to
the object system. The repair step may be refined to an a priori configuration of the
object system and the dynamic modification during problem solving. Usually, the apply
subtask is the one that modifies the object system.
Figure ?? depicts the inference structure of the diagnose-repair model. Input to the
analysis is the object system model or more precisely, an abstraction thereof. The analysis
produces findings about the state of the object system, like a quantitative description of
the complexity of the problem, the number of hypotheses or the set of competing actions.
The findings are interpreted as causes of incompetence like “overcomplex problem” or
“inconsistent state”, but can also be the basis for predicting the behavior of the object
system. The specific findings and causes will determine which repair actions are required
to overcome the incompetence. Separating the proposal of repairs from their actual ap-
plication allows to choose between incompatible proposals of different modules. Storing
its own experience allows the module to update its knowledge and use it for analyzing and
proposing repairs in the future. For instance, a reflective module decomposing a problem
can accumulate the solutions of already solved subproblems as experiences.
figure missing:
An inference structure for reflective competence assessment and improvement
In the inference structure for diagnose-repair tasks of figure ??, the “malfunctions”
play a crucial role. Above we suggested that essentially six categories of malfunctions
can be responsible for an object-system’s unsatisfactory behaviour on a given problem:
incompleteness, uncertainty, inconsistency, overcomplexity, irrelevancy and redundancy. –
Further categories like sufficiency of computing resources or the possibility to parse are
already situated at the implementation level.
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3.2.2 Reflective Domain Knowledge
In contrast with the other two layers of the model, this layer is mostly independent of the
choice of task for the reflective system. (i.e. diagnose-repair in our case). It is, instead,
more dependent than the other two layers on the fact that we are studying a reflective
system, which reasons about another problem solver. This is to be expected, since the
domain layer is supposed to capture the properties of the domain of reasoning, which, in
the reflective case, is another problem solver.
Domain knowledge of reflective systems consist of two parts: First there is the model of
the object-system, which has been discussed in section 3.1. Beside the model of the object
system there may be additional knowledge enabling the reflective component to perform its
task. To a large extend this knowledge embodies the expertise of knowledge engineers and
programmers evaluating their programs. The specific type of tasks performed determines
the kind of knowledge to be expected at the reflective domain layer. General categories of
knowledge that can be distinguished at the domain layer are:
• general knowledge about problem solving and reasoning
• knowledge abou the specific object task
• additional knowledge about the object domain
• additional knowledge about the object system realising this task in this domain
3.3 A space of architectures for knowledge level reflection
The preceding sections have all been concerned with the conceptual organisation of systems
that perform knowledge-level reflection, but have barely touched upon the issue of how
to implement such systems. That will be the topic of this section. We will lay out a
design space for the actual construction of the reflective component and its connection to
the object system. The dimensions of this design space follow from the specific nature
of a reflective system and will concern (i) how to realise the model of the object-system,
(ii) how to switch activity between object- and meta-system, and (iii) how to ensure a
correspondence between the object-system and its model at the meta-layer.
Before discussing each of these three design dimensions in the next three subsections,
we discuss the possibility of not implementing a reflective specification as a two-level
system at all.
Single level systems In principle, every reflective specification can be realised within a
single-level system: there is no inherent property of the reflective specification that makes
it impossible to integrate it with the object-system. The major reason for choosing the
single-level option is computational efficiency. However, there can be practical reasons
for leaving the object system intact. Often it is difficult and sometimes it is impossible
to modify the existing code of the object system. Even more important is that opting
for a multi-level architecture offers a number of advantages: a high degree of conceptual
clarity and modularity. The standard problems created through non-modularity are only
amplified in the case of the complex systems investigated here. Three system development
objectives that require a high level of conceptual clarity and modularity and thus lead to
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favoring a multi-level solution above a single-level one are reusability of reflective modules,
explanation and maintainability.
3.3.1 Realising a model of the object system
In the preceding sections, we extensively discussed the abstract nature of the object-model
that the meta-level has of the object-model. It contains structural knowledge such as task-
decompositions, primitive inferences and knowledge-roles. The emphasis for the model of
the object system is on describing the knowledge structures, rather than using them as in
the object system itself.
In this section we consider three alternatives for realisation of such an abstract model
of the object system in a reflective architecture.
Access procedures In this approach a direct connection between the reflective inference
layer and the language-structures of the object system is established by means of a set of
procedures of read and write access. No separate meta-representation of the object-system
is employed. The read procedures fill or update the contents of the reflective knowledge
roles. The write procedures directly modify the language structures of the object system.
Knowledge typing The second approach introduces a facility for knowledge typing, i.e.,
a declaration of the conceptual types of knowledge in the object system. The knowledge
typing mechanism serves as a view on the object system: it attaches knowledge types to
language structures of the object-system and limits access to those parts of the object
system for which this declaration is explicitly made. Again, in this case, no separate
meta-representation of the object-system is employed.
Separate representation In the third approach the model of the object system is
represented as a separate data structure and in a language that is different from the
language of the object system. It results in an implementation of a reflective system
that corresponds exactly to the conceptual description of such systems in the preceding
sections. This approach requires a causal connection that ensures the integrity and force
of the representation. (see Section 2.1.2). Because the language structures of the object
system are not directly manipulated by the reflective system, it is possible to delay the
synchronisation of representation and object system. This allows for multiple extensions
and modifications of the self-model to be investigated by the reflective system at the same
time, for example the comparison of alternative applicable methods in a reflective system
that schedules object problem solving steps.
These three options for realising the object-model are summarised in figure 2.
Guidelines
Access procedures can only realise an abstract model of the object system in an ad hoc
manner. A knowledge typing mechanism constitutes the model in a principled manner
either as an integral part of the language of the object system or by imposing a suitable
view on the object-system. The knowledge typing mechanism is a view on the object
system in the sense that modifications to the model are directly effectuated in the object
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Figure 2: Different ways of realising the object-model
system. This is suitable for reflective tasks that react to the current situation by immediate
actions, but would result in inconsistency of the object system when alternative extensions
are considered by the reflective task. The third approach of using a separate representation
allows for alternative extensions of the model. In combination with a knowledge typing
mechanism it realises a self model in a manner that fully corresponds with the conceptual
framework of the preceding sections. Another advantage is that the languages of object
system and representation are disjunct, clarifying the distinction between mention (at
the reflective level) and use (at the object level). The major drawback of the separate
representation is that it requires a specification of the self representation and introduces
the computational complexity of synchronisation as will be discussed in the next section.
3.3.2 Switching Paradigm
The conceptual view on reflection outlined in the previous sections presents an archi-
tectural problem, in that it represents two “active agents”: the object-system and the
meta-system. We have to implement a distribution of activity between these two parts of
a reflective system.
This switching paradigm constitutes the second dimension of our design space for reflec-
tive systems. In [vanHarmelen, 1991] we laid out a number of design options for switching
activity between object- and meta-layer which we will re-investigate in the context of the
notion of knowledge-level reflection.
Preferred switching paradigms
An obvious choice for switching activity between object- and meta-layers is subtask-
management: reflective knowledge is used to schedule the subtasks that make up the
object-level. We have used subtask-management successfully as the switching paradigm
in a number of experiments (section 4).
A rather different option (not occurring in [vanHarmelen, 1991]) is so-called external
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switching. The idea here is to introduce a third module that is responsible for switching
activity between the object- and reflective layers. We call such a third module a scheduler.
It is a meta-module for both the object- and the reflective layer, and determines when
either of these two should be active. The relation between the scheduler and the other
two systems should then be one of subtask management: the scheduler gives subtasks to
either the object- or the reflective layer. As with subtask-management, we have used this
switching paradigm successfully in a number of experiments (section 4).
Inadequate switching paradigms
A design option for the switching paradigm that is explicitly advocated in [vanHarmelen,
1991] ismeta-simulation. This ssumes that there will only be activity at the meta-level, and
requires a complete description of the object-system in the object-model. This description
can then be used to simulate the object-system at the meta-level.
However, it turns out that this option is unsuitable for realising the kind of reflective
systems investigated in this paper. The major assumption underlying meta-simulation is
that the representation of the object-system in the reflective layer is detailed enough to
allow full simulation of the object-system by means of this representation. This puts very
stringent requirements on the contents and amount of detail of the object-model: this
representation must be detailed enough to allow a full simulation of the object-system.
This requirement is in conflict with the major premise of the notion of “knowledge level
reflection”, as defined above which states that the object-model abstracts from the com-
putational aspects of the object-system. It would seem unlikely that such an abstract
object-model would enable a simulation of the object-system.
Adequate switching paradigms
There are two further options for the switching paradigm in our design space. Both
these options would be adequate choices, although both suffer from the problem that
they require some reflective knowledge as part of the object-system, instead of having all
reflective knowledge at the reflective layer.
For so-called crisis-management systems, a switch of the locus of action takes place
whenever a crisis occurs in the object-level computation. After the meta-system has
resolved this crisis, the object-system can proceed with the computation. Examples of
definitions of a crisis are when no or too much object-level knowledge is applicable, when
the object-level has run out of resources, or when the object-level needs more information.
The major drawback of this paradigm is that the definition of crisis needs to be inserted
into the object-system while it conceptually belongs at the meta-level
Reflect-and-act systems are the final option along this dimensions of our design space.
In reflect-and-act systems, the locus of action moves from object- to reflective layer when-
ever a predefined place in the object-computation has been reached. Two objections that
can be raised against this option are that switching only happens at predefined, fixed
places in the object-system’s cod and the switching need to be defined in the object-
system, rather than at the meta-level.
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3.3.3 Synchronising object-model and object-system
If, among the design option for realising the self-model outlined in section 3.3.1 we would
choose for an explicit representation of the object-model which is separate from the object-
system itself, we must somehow ensure both integrity and force of this model with respect
to the system it represents.
This section discusses a number of possible ways to realise this synchronisation, which
can be distinguished on the basis of when the synchronisation takes place on how much
information is copied between the object-system and its model.
When to synchronise
Eager synchronisation The most obvious option is to ensure that the two descriptions
of the object-system are always synchronised: changes are immediately propagated. This
type of synchronisation is required for the monitoring type of switching discussed above,
but is technologically hard to realise efficiently.
Lazy synchronisation The opposite of eager synchronisation is the arrangement where
changes in either representation are allowed to happen without propagation to the other
representation: only when a read operation is performed on one of the representations,
an update takes place. The advantage of this scheme is of course that it minimises the
amount of synchronisation that is performed by the system.
Synchronise on switching A third option is to exploit the control switching paradigm
that has been chosen. In particular, if a control paradigm has been chosen that involves
an explicit switch of the locus of action (i.e. subtask-management, crisis-management or
reflect-and-act), synchronisation can take place every time the locus of control is moved.
The justification for this is of course that in between such switches, only one of the two
representations is modified and read, so that we can delay the synchronisation until the
point of switching. Again, this arrangement avoids some unnecessary updates, but not as
many as lazy synchronisation.
How much to copy
A further option dimension in the design space for the causal connection is how much of
a representation should be copied in the process of synchronisation.
Full copying The easiest option is of course to make a full copy of one representation,
and translate it entirely into the other representation. Although conceptually very simple,
this option is likely to lead to efficiency problems when both representations are very large
and complicated.
Incremental copying - what is changed A much more efficient, but rather more
complicated option is to copy only those parts of a representation that have been actually
modified since the last synchronisation. This requires keeping track of modification times
of parts of the different models. This option further requires that there is “structural
correspondence” between the two representations of the object-problem solver, so that the
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elements in one representation can be linked to the corresponding elements in the other
representation. This is quite a strong requirement, which is not imposed by the “full
copying” option from the previous paragraph.
Incremental copying - what is required A final option is to copy not all datastruc-
tures that have changed, but all structures that are needed (irrespective of whether they
have been changed or not). This no longer requires timestamping datastructures, but
possibly copies too many data. It is of course also possible to combine this option with
the previous one to absolutely minimise the amount of data that is copied (at the expense
of complicating the implementation of the causal connection).
4 Validation
To validate our approach we built several reflective systems exploring a broad conceptual
and architectural spectrum. This section gives a survey of all experiments and presents
some in greater detail. An exhaustive description can be found in [Bartsch-Spo¨rl et al.,
1991].
4.1 A reflective assignment system
4.1.1 The object component
Our object was an assignment system that allocates components to so-called slots while
satisfying certain requirements. We called it OFFICE-PLAN as we actually used it to
allocate employees to office rooms. OFFICE-PLAN was rather incompetent. It tried to
solve even obviously inconsistent problems, for instance when there were more employees
than room for them in the offices. When it finally detected that there was no solution, it
could not propose any compromises. It did not recognize that a problem was overcomplex
so that it would need hours to solve it. In particular, it did not detect redundancies.
For instance a person that must sit in a single room trivially satisfies any different-room
constraints so that they may be dropped. It could not cope with underspecified problems,
e.g by evaluating more restrictive constraints first. From the five types of malfunctions
mentioned in section 3.2, uncertain knowledge was the only one that caused no problems,
because the system operated with categorical knowledge.
To tackle these four types of malfunctions – overcomplex, undercomplex, incom-
plete, and irrelevant knowledge – we built and integrated ten meta-components on top
of OFFICE-PLAN. They are generic so that they do not depend on the particular domain
of office planning. To a certain extent, they are neither specific to the particular problem
solving technique employed in the object component.
4.1.2 The ten meta-components and their integration
Roughly spoken, we have meta-components for feasibility studies, for resource manage-
ment, and for problem modifications. The latter do simplifications, relaxations, or elimi-
nate contradictions.
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Feasibility studies are performed by comparing available and required resources. With
this knowledge, we can prevent the object component from solving overcomplex or
”apparently” unsolvable problems.
Contradictions are detected both wrt. the requirements in the original problem state-
ment and wrt. the constraints in the internal representation, and relaxations are
negotiated with the user.
Redundancies of four different types can be detected and removed: between pairs of
requirements, pairs of constraints, between constraints and conditions, and between
constraints and the possible value restriction of constrained variables. Removing
these redundancies speeds up the solution process.
Decomposition and relaxation: One meta-component decomposes overcomplex prob-
lems and solves them stepwise, as much as possibly reusing previously found partial
solutions. By suitably composing solvable subproblems it can return approximate
solutions to overspecified problems. The component is rather quick, and its run-
time increases only linearly with the number of subproblems stored in its library.
Thus, problem solving time is substantially reduced. In contrast to feasibility stud-
ies, which only detect certain overspecifications, and in contrast to contradiction
removal, which is specialized to pairwise inconsistencies, this meta-component will
detect and solve any inconsistencies.
Resource limitations are introduced by limiting the time and the number of solutions
desired. To satisfy them, this meta-component controls the generate-and-test kernel
of OFFICE-PLAN by iteratively allocating time slices to the ”generate” and ”test”
steps. Its purpose is to achieve optimal performance under the given limitations.
Thus, we could specify the number of solutions we would be content to see, or we
could specify the time we are willing to wait and the system will do its best to
produce many solutions in that time, or even combine both.
Case-based reasoning allows to bypass the entire problem solving process by exploiting
a library of complete cases. By incorporating problems with relaxed solutions, this
meta-component can cope with inconsistent problems as well. However, it offers
a quick but risky approach, since the case-library may not contain a similar case.
Instead of including the case-library in the meta-component, we could have used a
case-based reasoner as a second object-component. The meta-component would then
only have to decide whether to invoke the case-based reasoner or OFFICE-PLAN.
In the reflective system, the functionality of the object component was extended, as
inconsistent problems can now be solved by making compromises. Additionally, system
utility was enhanced. The original system took an input problem, then fell silent for quite
a while to finally come up with all solutions, i.e. none if the problem was inconsistent.
In the reflective system, we can choose the number of solutions we want, the time we are
willing to spend, and we can have relaxations. Figure 3 shows the three dimensions of
utility and the values we can assign to each parameter. However, not all combinations can
be served by the meta-components. For instance, you cannot have relaxed solutions or all
solutions within a prespecified amount of time. To serve such impossible combinations we
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introduced priorities: Relaxation is more important than time which is more important
than the number of solutions. For instance, we cannot produce relaxed solutions within
predefined time limits. In this case, we relax and ignore the time.
utility values OFFICE- CASY COMIC TACKLE-
dimensions PLAN TIME
relaxation yes no no yes yes no
time quick [min, max] nomatter long quick often quick, [min,max]
but risky sometimes slow
no of few [min, max] all all all or all [min,max]
solutions none
Figure 3: Utility dimensions and how the specialists fit in
4.2 A spectrum of reflective systems
Altogether we developed 13 meta-components operating on three different object systems,
and combined them into reflective systems varying in the number of meta- and object
components. Beside the reflective OFFICE-PLAN system,
• we have a 1:13 reflective system [Bartsch-Spo¨rl et al., 1991; chapter 3] dealing with
a bug in a qualitative reasoner. Under certain circumstances, the system computes
multiple instances of a parameter resulting in different states which should actually
be identified. The bug can be repaired in three ways. We can change the library
of qualitative models before prediction which may be rather counter-intuitive. Or
we can fix the bug in the code of the system, which would require a very intimate
knowledge of some 10000 lines of Prolog code and probably a lot of debugging. So
we built a meta-component that spots the multiple parameter instances, identifies
them and merges the corresponding states.
• In another 1:1 reflective system [Bartsch-Spo¨rl et al., 1991; chapter 2] we deal with
the problem of multiple diagnoses in abductive reasoners. Instead of trying to explain
all symptoms by a multiple-fault diagnosis, we seek observations that explain most
of the symptoms and relax the others. This is done by computing the specificity
of the observations from the causal network and by considering the applicability of
the hypotheses for the currently observed symptoms. Other than in multiple fault
diagnoses, this approach allows to take into account dependencies between symptoms
and physiological interactions between diseases.
• A 1:2 reflective system [Bartsch-Spo¨rl et al., 1991; chapter 4] combines the two
object components already mentioned, the abductive reasoner and the qualitative
one. If abductive diagnosis fails to produce an explanation or if it cannot differentiate
between two hypotheses, causal connections are missing, which could be retrieved
by qualitative simulation. We built a meta-component that decides which object
component to invoke in which situation, and which controls and possibly repairs
this initial strategy.
3We use the n : m notation to indicate a system with n meta-modules and m object-modules.
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With this collection of 1:1, 1:2, and n:1 reflective systems we covered a broad scope,
including reflective diagnose&repair tasks, reflective resource management, and reflective
strategy construction. We tackled four different malfunctions, inconsistencies, redundan-
cies, incompleteness, and overcomplexity. Only uncertainty was not treated since it played
no role in any of our object components. Our meta-components realize very different re-
flective behaviors in that they inspect or modify different kinds of knowledge in the object
components. Table 1 summarizes the spectrum covered by our reflective systems.
dimension options explored
type of reflective system 1:1, 2:1, n:1
type of reflective task diagnose&repair, strategy construction, resource management
malfunctions inconsistency, irrelevancy, incompleteness, overcomplexity
general inference structure exact match, renamed, simplified, extended
Table 1: Spectrum covered by our experiments.
4.3 Architectural alternatives explored
To develop the reflective assignment system, we proceeded incrementally. Each meta-
component was built so as to constitute –together with the object component – a 1:1
reflective system. As soon as a number of interesting meta-components was available, we
integrated them into an n:1 system. We started by integrating the redundancy remov-
ing components, then added contradiction detection and feasibility studies, then resource
handling, then decomposition and relaxation, and finally the case-based reasoner. To
support this implementation technique, we had to modularize any aspects concerning the
scheduling of the meta-components and their coordination with the object component.
For this purpose, we introduced a scheduling layer on top of the task layers of the meta-
components. Since control between different components is exercised at this layer, the
suitable switching paradigm was the external subtask management regime.
Instead of implementing the ten meta-components in an general purpose language like
LISP or Prolog, we developed a language that directly supports the REFLECT-approach.
This language, called MODEL-K, represents one point in the design space laid out in
the previous section. Any meta-components defined in this language submit to the same
design decisions. This is the reason why in table 2 it is sufficient to juxtapose the options
explored in the other experiments with the design decisions for MODEL-K. We will shortly
comment the entries.
Representation and implementation languages: In the office allocation system, we
used MODEL-K to model and to implement, both, the object and the meta-
components. In the other experiments, the object and meta-components were mod-
eled in (ml)2, a logic based language for formalizing KADS models [vanHarmelen &
Balder, 1992], and implemented in Prolog.
Scope of model represented: In MODEL-K, the object system is an extension of its
conceptual model by any operational aspects. Thus, we had the complete model
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architectural dimension options explored
in other experiments in MODEL-K experiments
specification language ML MODEL-K
implementation language Prolog MODEL-K
switching paradigm subtask management external
object model:
scope of representation partial complete
access via representation, direct transparent
synchronization:
direction up, down up, down
scope full incremental
time at switch lazy (up), eager (down)
Table 2: Architectural options explored
available in the implementation. For object components modeled in (ml)2, we ex-
plored two alternatives. We either represented only the parts actually being ac-
cessed by the meta-component, or we dropped the model completely, because the
corresponding system was already written in Prolog in a structure preserving way.
Access: MODEL-K only supports a transparent access to the object model. In the other
cases, we either accessed the explicit Prolog representation of the model, or directly
the Prolog code of the object system.
Switching paradigm: For the 1:1 and 1:2 systems we used subtask management as the
most straightforward alternative. For the n:1 systems we used the external switching
facility built into MODEL-K.
Synchronization: Few of our reflective systems require only a synchronization upwards,
because the object-component is not modified. Most require a synchronization up-
wards and downwards. We used full and incremental updates, and effected them
eagerly, lazily, or at switching times. In MODEL-K, the update upwards is done
when data are required and done downwards eagerly.
With our experiments we actually explored some quite different points in the design
space defined in section 3.3. In particular, without the 10:1 experiment in office planning
we probably would not have noticed the need for an external scheduler. We conclude
that there is no unique set of design decisions, the guidelines we gave in that section were
derived from our experiments.
Beside these differences, we made some common experiences. All meta-components
somehow fit the inference structure shown in section 3.2. Thus, it should provide a good
starting point for modeling a meta-component. All our meta-components operate on a
very partial model of their object system. This may mean that the components are one on
the one hand quite general, on the other hand not to complicated. Although we explored
very different types of implemented the object model, realizing the causal connection was
always straightforward. Even more, we never had to modify the object systems. This
is very strong evidence for our approach of operating on knowledge level models of the
object components - provided they are implemented in a structure preserving way.
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5 Conclusions
5.1 The nature of reflection
Starting point of the REFLECT project was the notion of reflection as reasoning about
one’s own knowledge and capabilities. Through a study of the literature on reflection
and a systematic investigation of the conceptual space spanned up by the various forms
of reflective systems, we have identified a number of key issues that the designer of a
reflective system must decide upon.
From our study of the literature on reflection it becomes clear that there exist a wide
variety of conceptualisations of what reflection is. Despite the differences, the various
approaches to reflection point to a number of central notions. First of all, there is the
concept of a self model. The second common idea that we find in the various approaches
is that of a separation between the object and meta system as a means of coping with the
problems of self-referentiality, circularity and inconsistency.
Based on the observations sketched above, we have developed in the REFLECT project
a new approach to meta-level and reflective systems. This approach is based on a multi-
layered architecture where a sub-system located in one layer reasons about and operates
upon an abstract model of a sub-sustem represented in another layer. This approach
reflects two decisions. First, there is a clear separation of meta and object level. The main
rationale behind this choice is to circumvent the problems related to self-referentiality. As
a consequence the systems that we have investigated are not fully reflective in the sense
that they do not have a full self-model but only a partial one.
A second choice that was made in the REFLECT project concerns the nature of
the model of the object system. Rather than to choose a syntactic or computationally
oriented representation of the object system, we have opted for a representation that is
independent of the implementational details of the object system and that is meaningful,
i.e. is expressed in an ontology that reflects the purpose of the reflective reasoning. The
approach taken in REFLECT is very much in line with modern approaches to analyse
and describe knowledge-based systems. Here too, a consensus is emerging that in order
to understand knowledge-based systems, to re-use knowledge and to make more flexible
systems, a model of the knowledge and reasoning processes is necessary that abstracts
from implementation details and focusses on the knowledge content of a system [Wielinga
et al., 1992]. Newell [Newell, 1982] has introduced the term knowledge level for abstract,
implementation independent descriptions of AI systems Hence, we use the term knowledge
level reflection for reasoning about problem solving using abstract models.
5.2 The nature of the reflective task and associated meta-theories
Reflection in its common-sense meaning defines the object of the reasoning, i.e. the self,
but not the purpose of reflection. In our study of reflection we have discovered that
there are many different goals that reflective reasoning may serve. A common example
of a reflective task is to control the reasoning in the object system through meta-level
reasoning. This task has been extensively studied in the literature [vanHarmelen, 1991],
but other types of reflective tasks have not received much attention until very recently. In
the REFLECT project we have studied both reflective tasks concerned with controlling
the object problem solver (e.g. strategy planning and reasoning under limited resources)
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and other, non-control related reflective tasks. The latter include competence assessment
(estimate whether a system can solve a given problem in principle, and how difficult this
will be), quality assessment of the solutions produced by the object system, and combining
multiple problem solvers. We have found that many of the reflective tasks that have been
studied in prototype implementations have a similar structure. First an analysis is made
of the current state of the problem solving process. If anything is not according to the
expectations that the reflective component has, the discrepency is analysed and measures
are proposed to remedy the problem. In order to perform such reasoning, the reflective
component needs to be equipped with a meta-theory of the problem solving processes
that take place in the object problem solver. A crucial role in such meta-theories is played
by knowledge of deficiencies that can occur in the object problem solver. Five categories
of such deficiencies have been identified: incomplete information, uncertain information,
inconsistent information, overcomplex information and irrelevant information.
Although the meta-theories that were used in the various experiments are specific for
the type of reflective task and to some extent dependent on the specifics of the application
domain of the object problem solver, some general patterns begin to emerge in these
meta-theories. Meta-theories for reflection are about problem solving and as such they
contain general knowledge about problems, search spaces, solvability criteria, execution
time etc. For example the meta-theory that is used in the resource-limited reasoning task is
sufficiently general that it can be used for any system that is based on a generate-and-test
method.
One might argue that the level of abstraction that is used for modelling the object
problem solver may be too high in order to achieve interesting reflective behaviour. We
have illustrated through a number of examples that the use of abstracted models of the
object system still allows to formulate interesting and useful meta-theories. Additionally,
the abstract and hence implementation-independent nature of the models serves as a basis
for reusable meta-theories: meta-theories can be reused for different object systems which
can be modelled by the same abstract model.
5.3 Architectural options
Given the conceptual approach that was developed in REFLECT, a number of archi-
tectural options still remain open. First there are several ways in which the model of
the object system and the causal connection can be realised: a separate representational
structure can be used, special access procedures can be defined which inspect and modify
the object system directly and knowledge typing providing a certain view on the object
system, can be used to access the object knowledge. The separate representation option,
possibly in combination with the knowledge typing, appears the most flexible one, but has
as a drawback that maintaining the consistency between the model and the actual object
problem solver requires a complex synchronisation.
The switching paradigm is a second important choice point for the designer of a re-
flective system. The switching paradigm defines the distribution of activity between the
object and meta component. A number of options were found to be more or less suitable,
while others were not.
A third architectural problem is that of the synchronisation between the model of
the object system and the actual object problem solver. We have identified three dif-
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ferent strategies for synchronising: eager synchronisation (update whenever something is
changed), lazy (update when a piece of information is needed) and on switching. The
choice between these alternatives is a trade-off between efficiency and complexity.
Several of the architectural options were explored and tested in various prototype
systems. From these experiments we derived the judments about usefulness, adequacy
and feasibility of the various options. Choices with respect to some of the options will
depend on taste, style and requirements of the reflective task.
5.4 Technical Advances
In addition to the conceptual and theoretical advances made in the project, there are some
technical advances that the use of reflection offers. The first one is that of evolutionary
development of knowledge based systems. The REFLECT approach allows to enhance
the capabilities of an existing system by adding a reflective component equipped with an
abstract model of the object system. Both the experiments with the office-plan system
and with the GARP system show that little or no modification of the object system is
necessary when the meta-component is added. The abstract model needed is often already
available as a specification of the system, e.g. in the form of KADS models.
A second advance of the REFLECT approach is that of combinability of several object
problem solvers without having to re-engineer these systems. For example, as was demon-
strated in one of the experiments, several existing diagnostic systems can be combined
into a much more powerful system by adding a reflective module, without the need to
modify the individual object components. A second aspect of combinability is the pos-
sibility to add several additional capabilities, such as competence assessment, reasoning
under limited resources and flexible control, as separate reflective modules to an existing
KBS. The interactions between these reflecvtive components can then be controlled by a
straightforward scheduling module.
A third advance is that of reusability. reflective modules implement general capabilities
that are useful for a range of knowledge based systems. Through the approach taken in
REFLECT, where the meta-theory is separated from the model of the object system, one
may expect such modules to be reusable. For example modules implementing explanation,
flexible control or competence assessment can be made largely independent of the nature
of the object system.
In summary, we conclude that the approach developed in REFLECT has significant
application potential in the field of knowledge-based systems. One could argue that many
of the capabilities that we have described above, can be implemented in the object systems
themsleves, and indeed they can. However, it is precisely the architectural framework
developed in REFLECT that provides the modularity and combinability of software that
is so much needed, but so seldom achieved.
5.5 Unresolved issues and future work
The REFLECT project has laid the foundations of a methodology for building modular,
reusable and flexible knowledge-based systems. However, a number of issues remain to
be studied. An important limitation of the results of the project is their scope. We
will need proof that the approach tested in the various prototypes will scale up to real
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life applications. Even though some of the experiments used object problem solvers of a
significant size (e.g. GARP) more complex reflective systems need to be built.
A second area of further study is the nature of the meta-theories. As said above, some
general patterns in the meta-theories begin to emerge, but much more research is needed
to establish a general ontology and meta-theory of problem solving that can be a basis
for the development of meta-theoretical extentions for specific reflective tasks. Most of
the experiments that were performed in the project concern assessment and modification
of the dynamic structures involved in solving a problem. Reasoning about the scope
and capabilities of the static knowledge in order to assess the general competence of a
problem solver is a very difficult problem. Recent insights in the theoretical foundations
of diagnostic reasoning give however some hope that meta-theories can be developed that
generate advanced reflective behaviours for certain classes of object systems.
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